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Software acquisition has become the critical path in the procurement of
Department of Defense (DOD) weapon systems. Software requirements and their
complexity have increased at an exponential rate and support requirements now
constitute up to 70 percent of the software life cycle costs. This thesis presents the
concept of software Total Quality Management (TQM) which focuses on the entire
process of software acquisition, as a partial solution to the software acquisition crisis.
A software case study, analysis, and lessons learned with applications to the Army
Tactical Missile System (TACMS) is presented. A software process control maturity
model, a standard software language, and a set of software metrics are presented. A
discussion of program manager's responsibilities to implement a process control
mechanism to produce quality software products is presented. The principal finding
is that software acquisition is the major challenge to a program manager for weapon
systems procurement. The major recommendation of this study is that software TQM
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. GENERAL
Software acquisition has become the long pole in the tent for systems
acquisition. Weapon Systems have become extremely complex. As a result, the
software development has also become more technically challenging and costly. As
systems are upgraded, during upcoming austere budget years, software development
will receive more attention. This study of software acquisition, from a program
manager's (PM) point of view, will document and use a case study to show current
aspects of the software acquisition process as they apply to the present day
acquisition life cycle of a weapon system.
B. AREA OF RESEARCH AND OBJECTIVES
The primary focus of this research paper will be on the evolution of the
software acquisition and software applications as they apply to the Army Tactical
Missile System (TACMS) from a PM's point of view. Additionally, aspects of Total
Quality Management (TQM) will be addressed as they apply to software acquisition.
In conclusion, lessons learned will be/feviewed. In addition, a list of appropriate
questions a PM should ask, during the acquisition will be furnished. Answers to these
questions will provide a PM information as to the status of the software
development.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
How can the software acquisition process be improved?
2. Subsidiary Questions
• What situations, from a historical point of view, have caused the current
software crisis?
• How can Total Quality Management principles be applied to the software
acquisition process?
• What lessons can be derived from the Army Tactical Missile System software
acquisition process?
• What questions should a PM ask to ensure that the software acquisition
process is under control?
• What are the similarities and the differences between software and hardware
acquisition?
• What is the quality of a contractor's programming staff?
D. SCOPE
The main thrust of this thesis will focus on the Army Tactical Missile System's
software evolution. It begins with the software for the Multiple Launch Rocket
System (MLRS) and continues through the ongoing efforts for a potential Block II
upgrade. The MLRS System, currently in the Army inventory, is the basic system that
the Army TACMS uses as a platform for the Army TACMS missile. With a
combination of software and hardware modifications, the MLRS System was
upgraded to accommodate the Army TACMS missile. The software modifications to
accommodate the Army TACMS will be investigated. Issues pertaining to future
modifications will also be presented. Aspects of Total Quality Management (TQM)
will be discussed with respect to software acquisition. This thesis will be limited to
the historical aspects of the development of the software acquisition as they apply
to the Army TACMS software development.
E. METHODOLOGY
The first objective of this study will be to conduct an in-depth historical
overview of weapon system software acquisition. This will be accomplished by
reviewing applicable publications to include the latest periodicals and recent studies
conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School. The next step will be to conduct a
Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) search for software related
information. This initial investigation will provide the necessary information required
from an historical perspective and evolve into a case analysis. Interviews of personnel
internal and external to the Army TACMS project office will be conducted.
Additionally, personnel from the MLRS project office, contractor support offices,
and the Missile Command (MICOM) Software Engineering Directorate (SED) will
be interviewed.
F. BENEFITS OF STUDY
The primary benefit of this study will be the documentation of the software
acquisition for the Army Tactical Missile System. Secondary benefits will focus on
the potential uses ofTQM for the software acquisition process. A tertiary benefit will
be the generation of a generic set of questions PMs should ask about software to
ensure that they keep abreast of the status of the software in the acquisition process.
G. ORGANIZATION
Chapter II is an historical perspective which leads up to the current software
situation a PM faces. Current regulatory constraints, standards, and background
literature are presented.
Chapter III introduces the concept of TQM and possible applications to the
acquisition of software.
Chapter IV is an analysis of the Army Tactical Missile System software
acquisition process. Additionally, aspects ofTQM are presented as they apply to this
process.
Chapter V provides an analysis of the Army TACMS software development
process and culminates with lessons learned to date.
Chapter VI states the conclusions and recommendations, summarizes the





General William G.T. Tuttle, Jr., Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel
Command (AMC), opened the Army Executives for Software (ARES) forum, 17 July
1991, by briefing the importance of software as a force multiplier for the U.S. Army.
His briefing opened with an explanation that the reason for conducting the forum
was "because computer software is about to consume us... if it hasn't already
[Ref. 1]." General Tuttle's personal appearance at this forum is indicative of
the emphasis the Commanding General, Army Materiel Command, currently places
on software acquisition.
General Tuttle proceeded to explain that the entire acquisition community has
a stake in software for the following reasons:
• The user depends on technology to defeat the threat.
• Technology depends on software.
• Software enhances warfighting capability.
• Software can generally be changed cheaper/faster than hardware. [Ref. 1]
In culmination, General Tuttle reminded the acquisition community that they
should remember the following points:
• Software is not an add-on to our weapon systems-it is an inherent contributor
to our ability to fight.
• Our software technology is well ahead of our software management-we need
to close the gap.
• The first step - awareness of the issues and our role in closing the gap. [Ref.
1]
General Tuttle sets the stage for the modern day philosophy and the challenges
facing the PM and the software acquisition community. This thesis will stress his
emphasis on the importance of software acquisition.
B. SOFTWARE HISTORY
Software acquisition is the greatest challenge, and the biggest bottleneck, facing
the present day PM when acquiring the extremely complex weapon systems of the
modern technological era. Software engineering is the application of scientific and
managerial disciplines required to design, produce, modify, and maintain software
products. No clearly defined, standardized, software engineering process exists for
the acquisition of our weapon systems. Is software "engineering" an art or science?
Presently, few quantifiable methods exist to allow for measurement and statistical
analysis of an ill-defined software acquisition process. Weapon systems software
acquisition is still in its infancy. Education and knowledge of the past can perhaps
prove to be the PM's best weapon against the poor software acquisition methodology
currently employed. The remainder of this section will be devoted to the basic history
of software acquisition and the challenges it presents.
1. Historical Perspective
Mission Critical Computer Resources Management Guide, a publication of
the Defense Systems Management College [Ref. 2], provides one of the best
capsulized sources illustrating the exponential growth associated with the software
industry. The term "software engineering" was not used until 1968 and computer
software development is less than 40 years old. The realization that software
engineering is still in its infancy as an industry, coupled with the associated learning
curves for this profession, indicates why software acquisition is presently the
bottleneck of the entire Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition process.
Some of the reasons for the rapid growth in the software industry are
evidenced by tremendous advances in hardware and its associated capabilities.
Presently microprocessor chip technology and integrated circuits (ICs), the building
blocks for computer systems, have been greatly reduced in size, weight, power
requirements, and cost.
Most weapon systems have become extremely complex and are software
driven. Because it involves no physical change, software is inherently more flexible
than hardware. Unfortunately software, unlike hardware, is an intangible entity. It
is not readily understood by far too many managers. The above cited examples have
been major contributors to the software "crisis" facing PMs.
The Mission Critical Computer Resources Management Guide provides some
excellent insights to life cycle cost trends, and are presented in Figure 2-1 [Refs. 2,
3]. As a percent of current total acquisition costs, software development and
support costs are today approximately 80% (20% hardware), compared to only 20%
for software (80% hardware) costs in the mid 1960's era. Another significant cost
trend in the software cost explosion is shown in Figure 2-2 [Ref. 2:Fig 7-2]. Of the
total software acquisition life cycle requirement, 70% of the cost is associated with
sustainment (software support/maintenance). Another interesting historical
observation is..."DOD found that the average cost of generating a line of code is
about seventy-five dollars while the average cost of modifying a line of code late in
the development cycle or after software delivery is four-thousand dollars [Ref.
2:7-7]."
Table 2-1 shows the relative cost to fix software as a function of the
software developmental phase. This table indicates where software errors are
introduced and found during the software acquisition life cycle. The most significant
information is shown for the operations and maintenance phase. Only five percent
of the software errors are introduced while 22 percent are found. This phase
contributes between ten and 100 times the cost to fix software errors as compared
to correcting software errors during the requirements analysis phase. This trend
clearly indicates that software support is becoming the bottleneck within the




Figure 2-1. Life Cycle Cost Trends
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Figure 2-2. Software Costs
TABLE 2-1. COSTS OF SOFTWARE FIXES







REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 5% 55% 18% 1.0
DESIGN 25% 30% 10% 1-1.5
CODE & UNIT TEST 10%
INTEGRATION & TEST 50% 10% 50% 1.5-5.0
VALIDATION & DOCUMENTATION 10%
OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE 5% 22% 10-100
2. The Achilles' Heel
James Kitfield provides some insights to the dilemma facing DOD with
respect to software acquisition by stating that the demand for software is increasing
by 25% per year while the education system only generates 4% more programmers
per year. He further states the following:
Consider only that while computer performance has increased a thousandfold
in the last 30 years, due largely to the incredible shrinking microchip, the
software that instructs computers is still crafted by a painstaking process that
is much the same as it was in 1960. Imagine that at a time when the United
States faces a severe shortfall of civilian and military software professionals,
DOD's demand for new software is equal to the entire amount it currently has
to use. [Ref. 4]
Kitfield further illustrates the rapid expansion of software and the resultant
complexity in our weapon systems by the following comparison [Ref. 4]:
10
TABLE 2-2. SYSTEM AND SOURCE LINES OF CODE





ATF 5,000,000 to 7,000,000
SDI 25,000,000 (est.)
With this situation facing the DOD software acquisition community, it becomes
readily apparent why General Bernard Randolf, chief of Air Force Systems
Command, described software as an "Achilles' heel" in weapon systems development.
3. Software Risk Items
As part of the Software Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E)
Symposium, 1 November 1990, Barry Bohem, Defense Advanced Research Projects
(DARPA), presented the top ten software risk items as follows [Ref. 5]:
• Personnel shortfalls.
• Unrealistic schedules and budgets.
• Developing the wrong software functions.
• Developing the wrong user interface.
• Gold plating.
• Continuing stream of requirements changes.
• Shortfalls in externally-furnished components.
11
• Shortfalls in externally-performed tasks.
• Real-time performance shortfalls.
• Straining computer science capabilities.
The above information is a further example of the confrontation facing the
present day software environment.
4. Snowball Effect
Lieutenant General Jerome B. Hilmes, Director Information Systems for
Command, Control, Communications and Computers, describes the software crisis
as a snowball effect. The initial problem stems from inadequate requirements
definition leading to inadequate development of resources. As the snowball increases
in its size, while rolling down the "acquisition hill" at an ever increasing velocity,
excessive changes occur during development causing schedule and cost growth.
Further down the "acquisition hill" at increasing velocity, the delivery of immature
products result, causing software and system failures. When the snowball reaches its
final "resting" place, the software crisis is readily apparent by excessive maintenance
costs. The result is unfavorable General Accounting Office (GAO), and Inspector
General (IG) reports, with congressional inquiries and oversights.
5. Historical Summary
Software acquisition can be described as being in a crisis situation for
many of the reasons previously outlined. The crisis becomes apparent when viewed
from the PM's point of view, given the rapid expansion of software requirements for
12
weapon systems relative to the availability of a mature software acquisition process.
The proceeding illustrations define the present day culture for software acquisition
as it applies to the PM within the DOD.
C. PRESENT SITUATION
The Army Acquisition Executive, Stephen K. Conver, recently discussed the
success stories from operation Desert Storm [Ref. 6]. The following weapon
systems were highlighted as success stories:
• Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS).
• Apache (AH-64) armed with Hellfire missiles.
• Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS).
• Army Tactical Missile System (TACMS).
• Bradly Fighting Vehicle Systems (BFVS).
• Abrams (M-l Tank).
Mr. Conver additionally remarked on the importance of maintaining the
"precious technological edge [Ref. 6]." The success stories associated with the
Southwest Asia deployment are indicative of the key roll that software plays in
modern weapon systems. Each of the previously cited weapons have software
intensive subsystems.
Brigadier General William J. Mullen III, Deputy Director of Operations (J3),
Forces Command, further emphasized the importance of software in operation
Desert Storm [Ref. 7]. His observations, addressed to the Army Executives
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for Software (ARES) forum on 17 July 1991, cited specific software impacts as a
combat multiplier on the modern battlefield. His first example was the Patriot missile
system. He noted the Patriot's increased capability to shoot down the SCUD missile
was attributable to a major upgrade in only the software. Software was a true force
multiplier. Other examples Brigadier General Mullen included in his presentation
were:
• Apache (AH64)
• Prisoner of War Information System-2 (PWIS-2)
• TOW
• AN/APR-39 Radar Warning Receiver System
Brigadier General Mullen clearly articulated the importance software played in
Southwest Asia by stating: "It is apparent we are not going to do our jobs without
software." [Ref. 7]
Both Mr. Conver and Brigadier General Mullen emphasized the important role
software plays in weapon systems, the versatility software provides, and how the
future depends on quality software.
D. REGULATIONS AND GUIDANCE
This section is devoted to describing the minimum set of reference materials
a PM should be well versed in for software and software acquisition.
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1. Mission Critical Computer Resources Management Guide
The Mission Critical Computer Resources (MCCR) Guide is a good starting
point for a program manager to obtain a broad perspective of software acquisition
policies and terminology set forth in the Department of Defense (DOD). This guide
gives a brief synopsis and history of computer systems. It then evolves into
acquisition policy, to include applicable regulations and policies. Additionally, the
following topics are covered: software support, test and evaluation, configuration
management, and metrics. The MCCR Guide is a must starting place for all people
interested in software development. [Ref. 2]
2. DOD Directive 5000.1
Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, dated February 23, 1991, is the
top level document that "establishes a disciplined approach for acquiring systems and
materiel that satisfy the operational user's needs [Ref. 8]." This regulation
does not specifically address software acquisition. It does provide an excellent road
map to all applicable documentation and regulations pertaining to weapon systems
and software acquisition.
3. DOD Instruction 5000.2
Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, dated February 23, 1991, Part
6, Section D, "Computer Resources," supersedes both DOD Directive 5000.29,
"Management of Computer Resources in Major Defense Systems," dated April 26,
1976, and DOD Directive 3405.2, "Use of Ada in Weapon Systems," dated March 30,
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1987. This directive sets the standards and procedures required for the procurement
of embedded computer resources within DOD. Additionally, all applicable statutes,
regulations, and standards are listed. [Ref. 9]
4. DOD-STD-1467 (AR)
Department of Defense Standard 1467 (AR), "Military Standard Software
Support Environment," dated 18 January, 1985 [Ref. 10], establishes the
minimum requirements for the contractor to construct a Developmental Software
Support Environment (DSSE), and to ensure the compatibility of this environment
with a contracting activity's designated Life Cycle Software Support Environment
(LCSSE). The most important element of this document establishes the necessary
procedures PMs need to ensure life-cycle software support requirements are properly
defined.
5. DOD-STD-2167A
Department of Defense Standard 2167A, "Defense System Software
Development," dated 29 February 1988, outlines the requirements for software
acquisition with respect to development, sustainment, and life-cycle support of
software systems. This standard also addresses the process of tailoring the
specification for software and firmware development. This document provides the
program manager with at least a minimum set of standards to begin the software
acquisition process. [Ref. 11]
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6. DOD-STD-2168
Department of Defense Standard 2168, "Defense System Quality Program,"
dated in 1988, provides current information on how to set up a quality software
assurance program. [Ref. 12]
7. Military Handbooks
The following handbooks will provide additional information on software:
• MIL-HDBK-286, "Software Quality Evolution" [Ref. 13]
• MIL-HDBK-287, "A Tailoring Guide for DOD-STD-287, Defense System
Software Development." [Ref. 14]
• MIL-HDBK-782, "Software Support Environment Acquisition."
[Ref. 15]
8. Army Regulations and Pamphlets
The following are Army documents associated with embedded software:
• AMC-R, 70- 16,"Management of Computer Resources in Battlefield Automated
Systems" [Ref. 16], establishes the requirements for a PM to ensure
software is effectively planned, developed, acquired, tested, fielded, and
supported.
• AMC-P, 70-13, "Software Management Indicators, Insight" [Ref. 17],
establishes metrics for PM use.
• AMC-P, 70-14, "Software Management Indicators, Quality Insight"
[Ref. 18], also establishes metrics for PM use.
These are the minimum set of publications necessary for a PM to review for software
acquisition as it applies to the Army.
17
E. SUMMARY
This historical background chapter began with an opening from the AMC
commander, General Tuttle, stating his philosophy on the importance of software
and software acquisition as it applies to the modern Army. The next portion was
devoted to the historical situation that has produced the current situation that
confronts the software industry at the present time. One section was structured to
list the more important literature, guidance, and regulations a PM should have a firm
grasp on to alleviate the software bottleneck that currently exists within the DOD.
The next chapter will introduce the philosophy of Total Quality Management (TQM)
as it applies to the process of software acquisition.
18
III. TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT AND SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter is designed to present possible applications of Total Quality
Management (TQM) for the process of software acquisition. Dr W. Edwards
Deming's philosophy on TQM provides the initial basis for this discussion. His
methodology on TQM is then applied to software acquisition. Essential
characteristics of TQM, to include process control, standardization, and the use of
measuring devices (metrics), as they apply to software acquisition are presented. The
necessity of upper management commitment to the customer and continuous process
improvement are also addressed.
B. TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY
This section introduces the concept of Total Quality Management (TQM). The
basic philosophy of TQM principles from a Department of Defense (DOD)
perspective is stated as:
Total Quality Management (TQM) is both a philosophy and a set of guiding
principles that represent the foundation of a continuously improving
organization. TQM is the application of quantitative methods and human
resources to improve the material and services supplied to an organization, all
the processes within an organization, and the degree to which the needs of the
customer are met, now and in the future. TQM integrates fundamental
management techniques, existing improvement efforts, and technical tools
under a disciplined approach focused on continuous improvement.
[Ref. 19]
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This definition provides a philosophy that all DOD acquisition managers can use
during the procurement process for both software and hardware.
The DOD definition of TQM comes directly from the teachings of Dr. W.
Edwards Deming, considered the pioneer in this field. His basic belief is that high
quality leads to high productivity and customer satisfaction enhances productivity
because rework of the product is decreased or eliminated, no scrap is generated, no
time is required to correct defects, and the customer remains satisfied. Quality is also
the primary requirement for any product produced.
In providing any goods or services emphasis should be placed on both the
ultimate customer (user) and each of the intermediary customers engaged in the
process. In addition, a clearly defined process to identify the organizational structure
and procedures for work activities is necessary. Standardization and statistical process
control (SPC) procedures to reduce variations that cause poor quality also need to
be defined and implemented.
TQM also requires a feedback loop be identified. This feedback loop provides
the necessary information for the process that allows for change in the system. It
provides the core requirement for continuous process improvement. This
methodology will be used to analyze software acquisition as it applies to TQM.
Dr. Deming has consolidated his beliefs on TQM into the following 14 points:
1. Create constancy of purpose toward improvement of product and service, with
the aim to become competitive and to stay in business, and to provide jobs.
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2. Adopt the new philosophy. We are in a new economic age. Western
management must awaken to the challenge, must learn their responsibilities,
and take on leadership for change.
3. Cease dependence on inspection to achieve quality. Eliminate the need for
inspection on a mass basis by building quality into the product in the first
place.
4. End the practice of awarding business on the basis of price tag. Instead,
minimize total cost. Move toward a single supplier for any one item, on a
long-term relationship of loyalty and trust.
5. Improve constantly and forever the system of production and service, to
improve quality and productivity, and thus constantly decrease costs.
6. Institute training on the job.
7. Institute leadership. The aim of supervision should be to help people and
machines and gadgets to do a better job. Supervision of management is in
need of overhaul, as well as supervision of production workers.
8. Drive out fear, so that everyone may work effectively for the company.
9. Break down barriers between departments. People in research, design, sales,
and production must work as a team, to foresee problems of production and
in use that may be encountered with the product or service.
10. Eliminate slogans, exhortations, and targets for the work force asking for zero
defects and new levels of productivity. Such exhortations only create
adversarial relationships, as the bulk of the causes of low quality and low
productivity belong to the system and thus lie beyond the power of the work
force.
11. a. Eliminate work standards (quotas) on the factory floor. Substitute
Leadership.
b. Eliminate management by objective. Eliminate management by numbers,
nnm*»ri^^l or»ulc QnKctif-iit<» 1<»aH«»rcV«ir»numerical goals. Substitute leadership
12. a. Remove barriers that rob the hourly worker of his right to pride of
workmanship. The responsibility of supervisors must be changed from sheer
numbers to quality.
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b. Remove barriers that rob people in management and in engineering of the
right of pride of workmanship. This means, inter alia, abolishment of the
annual or merit rating and of management by objective.
13. Institute a vigorous program of education and self- improvement.
14. Put everyone in the company to work to accomplish the transformation. The
transformation is everybody's job. [Ref. 20]
Actual improvements can be achieved by the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle
discussed by Deming [Ref. 20]. This cycle provides management with a mechanism
to make and observe changes placed on a process. It is a continuous cycle. The first
step is to plan for a change. This plan should then be carried out or tested (the do),
preferably on a small scale. The third step (check) is an important part of this cycle.
It consists of observing the effects of the change. The final step, means to take
appropriate action from what was learned.
Observations of the PDCA cycle will give management greater knowledge as
the cycles are repeated, changed, and implemented. This is a continuous process,
stimulated by feedback. Deming also speaks of profound knowledge. One can not
improve a process unless one has profound knowledge of the process. The 14 points,
PDCA cycle, and the system of profound knowledge together form the framework
for Deming's TQM. Profound knowledge should include systems theory, statistical
theory, the psychology of people, as well as a deep understanding of learning and
change. The result is quality production.
The next section describes how TQM principles can be applied to the software
acquisition process.
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C. SOFTWARE TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT
In this section possible applications of TQM to the process of software
acquisition are discussed. For the purpose of this thesis, quality software is defined
as the absence of errors or defects from the end product. Some would argue that
totally error free software is almost impossible to achieve. Yet, in applying the
provisions ofTQM, error free software is the ultimate goal. Continuous improvement
in the software development process, can approach the goal of error free software.
The remainder of this chapter will focus on software TQM.
Richard E. Zultner [Refs. 21, 22] provides some insights and potential
examples for applying the TQM methodology to software development. He first
modifies Deming's 14 points. For example; point 5 describes the importance of
process control, point 6 emphasizes the essentiality of education, and point 9 shows
that breaking down barriers in communication is necessary to produce quality
software. The entire set of adopted points are listed in Appendix D. He also changes
Demings' seven deadly diseases for software quality. The following seven areas
should be avoided to attain quality software:
1. Lack of constancy of purpose to develop software that will satisfy users, keep
software developers in demand, and provide jobs.
2. Emphasis on short-term schedules--short-term thinking (just the opposite of
constancy of purpose toward improvement), fed by fear of cancellations and
layoffs, kills quality.
3. Evaluation of performance, merit rating, and annual reviews—the effects of
which are devastating on individuals, and therefore quality.
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4. Mobility of software professionals and managers. Job hopping makes
constancy of purpose, and building organizational knowledge, very difficult.
5. Managing by "visible figures" alone-with little consideration of the figures that
are unknown and unknowable.
6. Excessive personnel costs. Due to inefficient development procedures,
stressful environment, and high turnover, software development person-hours
are too high.
7. Excessive maintenance costs. Due to bad design, error ridden development,
and poor maintenance practices, the total lifetime cost of software is
enormous.
Zultner also evolves these principles into areas that should be avoided while
designing quality software. For example, when the user's requirements are
continuously changing the result will be poor quality software. He concludes with an
excellent synopsis: "When you build better, you do each task only once—no rework,
no fixes necessary—and that's the fastest (and cheapest) way to build software." [Ref.
22]
In an article in Program Manager, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony F. Shumskas,
USAF, provides some excellent examples on how to apply TQM to software
acquisition [Ref. 23]. He indicates that DOD-STD-2167A (Defense System
Software Development) and DOD-STD-2168 (Defense System Software Quality
Program) provide the structure for applying TQM to the process of software
development. This reduces errors and results in higher quality software. In general
terms, Shumskas states that managers' commitment to the user's needs (as specified
in the requirements definition), continuous improvement, and education are essential
elements for quality software acquisition. He identifies three unique attributes to
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software TQM as being: process control (process maturity model); standardization
(Ada); and metrics (measuring devices). A detailed discussion on these three items
is presented in sections D, E, and F. Lieutenant Colonel Shumskas' evaluation
indicates that applying TQM to software acquisition has resulted in a decrease of the
following: 35 percent savings in development cost, a 50 percent decrease in test time
and cost, and 50 percent decrease in documentation costs [Ref. 23].
Captain Roj Karimi, USAF, reinforces the notion that TQM can be applied to
the process of software acquisition [Ref. 24]. His main point is that control
of the software process may be measured by using a basic set of metrics to measure
schedule, effort, code production and test. Applying statistical control to these
metrics to determine process deviation results in higher quality software. He
summarizes by stating that the goal is to obtain 100 percent quality software for the
customer.
It is important to realize that the TQM philosophy can be applied to software
acquisition. Basic TQM principles such as customer satisfaction, education,
elimination of barriers to communication, and management's commitment to change
are essential elements to any software TQM initiatives. In addition there are three




In 1984, the United States Air Force, Electronics System Division, Hanscom
AFB, contracted the Software Engineering Institute (SEI), located at
Carnegie-Mellon University, to investigate and analyze the current software
acquisition process. Their first step was to define the software process. SEI
determined the following:
The software process is the set of activities, methods, and practices which guide
people (with their software tools) in the production of software. An effective
process must consider the relationships of the required tasks, the tools and
methods, and the skills, training, and motivation of the people involved.
[Ref. 25]
This definition provides the basic foundation for the software acquisition process.
As a result of this investigation, SEI constructed a Software Process Maturity
Model, Figure 3-1 [Ref. 25:Fig. 1.2.1], as a tool to improve the software acquisition
process. There are five levels. The maturity levels are defined as follows:
1. Initial Level (1). This level has no defined process and is chaotic. It lacks
formality in plans, procedures, integration, and management commitment for
improvement. This level is devoid of virtually all TQM principles.
2. Repeatable Level (2). Management begins to get involved to establish only
basic controls. The software process is not yet clearly defined. This level starts
to employ some of the TQM beliefs.
3. Defined Level (3). This level introduces software engineering principles,
architecture, and technologies. The organization has now established a process
with the realization that the process will require continuous improvement.
4. Managed Level (4). Data are now gathered and analyzed, yet the full utility
of this information is not readily apparent. A minimum number of
quantitative parameters for quality control and productivity are established.
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5. Optimizing Level (5). Data collection is automated, and defect prevention is
used. Customer satisfaction is the number one priority. This level is marked
by an organization that has attained control over their process; they focus on
continuous improvement. This is the ultimate goal of software TQM.
Examination of the model leads one to realize that as the maturity level
increases from the initial level to subsequently higher levels, the risk of producing
poor quality software is diminished.
TABLE 3-1. SEI SOFTWARE PROCESS MATURITY MODEL
Level Characteristic Key Problem Areas Result
Optimizing Improvement fed back Automation Productivity /
into process & Quality /
Managed (quantitative) Changing technology
Measured process Problem analysis
Problem prevention
/
Defined (qualitative) Process measurement
Process defined and Process analysis /
institutionalized Quantitative quality plans
/
Repeatable (intuitive) Training
Process dependent on Technical practices /











As previously outlined, one of the key elements of TQM is to define the
process and then continuously improve it to obtain quality products. The SEI
software process maturity model provides an organized approach for implementing
software TQM. As the process is improved by moving from one level to the next
higher level the software quality is also increased. The SEI model provides guidelines
for management to use in determining their maturity level. Management's goal is to
be at the optimizing level.
The SEI has made an assessment of various software producing organizations.
A questionnaire, about 120 questions, and an onsight verification are used to
determine the appropriate maturity level of an organization. As of April 1991, with
296 projects reviewed, SEI had determined the following: 88 percent of the software
projects were at Level (1), five percent were at Level (2), five percent were at Level
(3), no projects were found to be at Level (4), and two percent were at Level (5)
[Ref. 26]. This means that software TQM principles are not currently employed in
the software industry. The SEI Software Process Maturity Model is an excellent
measuring device that management can use in determining where they currently are
with regards to good software development techniques.
The DOD TQM Maturity Model, Appendix E [Ref. 27], is an
adaptation of SEI's Software Process Maturity Model to incorporate software TQM
issues. This model identifies eight TQM categories. It relates them to SEI's maturity
level by stating the traits associated at a given level. For example, in a Level (1)
organization, software tools and statistics on the process are not identified or used.
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As an organization improves its process, tools begin to be used. The highest level is
marked, not only by the use of tools, but also by statistical process control being
known and applied by all employees. This model illustrates how TQM can be directly
correlated to the SEI maturity model.
The bottom line is that management's goal is to be at maturity Level (5), the
point where good TQM philosophies are incorporated in the design and development
of software. The next section will discuss the principle of standardization and how
it applies to software acquisition.
E. STANDARDIZATION
An essential element for the implementation of a repeatable and continuously
improving process is standardization. This important element is directly applicable
to a process of software acquisition that embraces the TQM philosophy of reducing
variability. DOD Instruction 5000.2, Part 6, Section D, specifies Ada as "...the only
programming language to be used in new defense systems and major software
upgrades of existing systems...when cost effective" [Ref. 9].
Ada is a DOD trademark. As such a compiler can only be termed an "Ada
compiler" after having passed a series of tests/benchmarks which certify it compiles
with the ISO standard for the Ada higher order language (HOL). Only then will the
DOD approve the use of the term "Ada." By using the Ada language for weapon
systems software, DOD achieves a significant degree of standardization.
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With standardization comes the feasibility of more effective software reuse.
Different variants of languages and compatibility problems can be eliminated.
Software can be designed and developed for specific packages. These packages can
be integrated to form a system. Developing modular packages for specific functions
leads itself to the concept of software reuse for different applications. Reusable
software: "[The] key breakthrough in object technology is the ability to build large
programs from lots of small, prefabricated ones [Ref. 28]."
Standardization provides the potential to reduce the process variation presently
facing software acquisition, an essential philosophy of TQM. It also should ease the
portability of software to allow for use across different computers.
F. METRICS
Software metrics are tools to be used by managers to assist them in their ability
to measure the progress of software development. Statistical process control (SPC),
an essential element of TQM, is the ability to quantitatively measure any production
process to determine common or special causes of variation that produce poor
quality products. Software metrics provides these measuring devices. This section
reviews the set of metrics currently used by the MICOM Software Engineering
Directorate (SED).
The MICOM SED was established in July 1984 with the requirement to provide
the Mission Critical Computer Resource (MCCR) expertise needed for weapon
systems over their life cycle. As a management tool SED constructed a standard set
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of metrics for the MICOM community consisting of eight items. This set of metrics
is a living document. The metrics are subject to change pending feedback from
contractors, program offices, and field requirements. Presently the SED is measuring
eight items. The following is a brief summary [Ref. 29]:
1. Requirements Stability: measures the number of software requirements that
change from the given baseline. The first step in software development is to
identify each software requirement specification. Each separate requirement
generally starts out by stating "the software shall..." After the total number
of requirements are defined they are tracked as a function of time. Over time,
additional requirements are frequently added. Ratings of red, amber, and
green are assessed on the percent deviation from the base software
specification.
2. Software Development Manpower: this metric measures the developer's actual
effort against the developer's approved plan for effort allocation. The
contractor provides an estimated manpower requirement, and this indicator
monitors the actual verses the planned personnel requirement. Ratings of red,
amber, and green are given based on the actual deviation from the original
manpower requirement baseline.
3. Software Development Progress: measures the completeness of the software
development. The developer provides a developmental plan across all phases
and work elements of the software development. This indicator measures the
actual to planned progress of the development for the software. The red,
green, and amber assessments are based on percentage deviation from the
actual schedule.
4. Computer Resource Utilization: measures the utilization of each computer
processor, memory, and input/output channel. This is a straight forward
indicator that measures the percent utilization for the above items. A
significant reserve capacity is desired to allow for future growth capacity.
5. Schedule Risk Analysis: measures the developer's schedule against their
actual schedule. The primary purpose is to assess the realism of the
developer's schedule. This measurement compares the development schedule
to the cumulative man months expended.
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6. Trouble Report Resolution: measures the relative number of trouble reports
within a specified time period. These reports are categorized as catastrophic,
severe, or moderate. The red, amber, and green assessments are based on the
number and severity of the trouble reports.
7. Software Product Delivery: measures the timeliness and acceptability of the
software products. This is a straightforward measurement of planned to actual
product deliveries. Red, amber, and green assessments are based on
acceptable delivery.
8. Software Supportability: Uses a 16 factor model to determine Post
Deployment Software Support (PDSS) supportability. Such factors as
documentation, testing, and supportability are assessed. Red, amber, and
green ratings are determined by the summation of these factors.
These metrics were constructed to have a minimal cost impact on the software
development process. An excellent source of other examples of metrics can be found
in the Air Force Systems Command, Electronics Systems Division and MITRE
document, ESD-TR-88 [Ref. 30].
Metrics play a critical role in the TQM of software acquisition by providing
quantitative means of gathering data. "Management metrics let you assess both the
process and the product at periodic data points, predict trends in the process and
product parameters, and specify changes to be made to the process in response to
identified problems so you can influence the product as it is being developed."
[Ref. 31]
G. SUMMARY
This chapter presented the concept of TQM as a focus on the entire software
acquisition process. Conventional software acquisition focuses on the resultant
software quality at the end of the "black art" process. The ultimate customer needs
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are the essential element for the proper implementation of TQM. Commitment from
upper management, as shown by General Tuttle's emphasis on the importance of
software, is another TQM philosophy. SEI has designed a model to define the
software acquisition process at various maturity levels; it is a measurement device to
be used to constantly improve the process. Standardization and the use of Ada will
reduce variability in the process. Metrics provide a measuring technique to assess the
software acquisition process. Process control, the SEI model; standardization, Ada;
and metrics, for SPC, are unique Software TQM traits. Software TQM defines a
process and continuously improves it. Adhering to software TQM will enable
producers to approach Level (5). This is the ideal approach to software acquisition.
This chapter has demonstrated that TQM is applicable to the process of software
acquisition within DOD.
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IV. CASE STUDY: ARMY TACTICAL MISSILE SYSTEM
A. INTRODUCTION
The Army Tactical Missile System (Army TACMS) and the Multiple Launch
Rocket System (MLRS) were commended for attaining exemplary performance
during the Gulf War. Stephen K. Conver, the Army Acquisition Executive, stated:
"...that Army TACMS destroyed, or rendered inoperable, all of its targets [Ref. 6]."
He also indicated that MLRS's "rain of steel," fired more than 10,000 rockets
attaining outstanding performance. The Army Times indicates the proposed 1993
defense budget will include both Army TACMS and MLRS, the "[stars] of the
Persian Gulf war [Ref. 32]." Both of these systems are software intensive,
and have proven themselves in a combat environment.
The MLRS is the firing platform for Army TACMS. The software interfaces
between the two systems have posed a managerial challenge. Subsequent sections in
this chapter will present the evolution of Army TACMS. The first section introduces
and explains the basic MLRS as it applies to Army TACMS. The primary focus is
on software and software related issues concerning Army TACMS. The final section
presents possible future applications for the Army TACMS.
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B. MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET SYSTEM
The MLRS is a derivative of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, consisting of a
mounted rocket launcher that is an all weather, highly mobile, multiple launch rocket
system. The MLRS mission requires rapid response with high volume, indirect fire
with conventional munitions against enemy artillery units, air defense batteries, and
lightly armored equipment and personnel. This system is fielded to U.S. Army
divisional units as batteries (9 launchers), and to corps units as battalions (3
batteries). This Field Artillery (FA) system is employed in a general support artillery
role. [Ref. 33]
The basic MLRS production contract was awarded in 1977 with an Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) in March 1983. The contractor structured the software
architecture with low risk technology. As a result there was virtually no room for
software expansion, without expensive hardware retrofits. This computer technology,
from the mid 1970's, rapidly eroded into obsolescence.
The Fire Control System (FCS) is software intensive. The FCS contains the
software that is responsible for ballistic computation, navigation, reloading, display,
command, control, communication, and automated aiming for MLRS. The primary
FCS components are:
• Fire Control Panel (FCP): The FCP is the system input/output device where
the operator interfaces with the FCS.
• Electronics Unit (EU): The EU is the computer and memory that calculates
the necessary data for the fire missions of the system.
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• Stabilization Reference Package/Position Determining System (SRP/PDS): The
SRP/PDS establishes the elevation, azimuth, location, and position of the
system as it moves from point to point, on a continuous basis.
• Fire Control Unit (FCU): The FCU provides the electronic coordination
among the FCS, SRP/PDS, and the electromechanical interfaces of the system.
The original FCS hardware, contained in the EU, was program read only
memory (PROM). This antiquated system required a hardware modification
(removal and replacement of the PROM) whenever the software requirements
changed. Upgrading the PROM software required inserting new boards into the EU.
This required the retrofitting of all fielded units, a costly endeavor. In addition, the
EU software memory requirements soon expanded, using up the remaining memory
capacity. This greatly restricted the possibility for future growth or change.
Also, the software architecture for the original FCS did not support the
addition of new munitions or provide'for growth of the existing set of munitions that
were fired from the basic MLRS. Rapid expansion of software requirements and
future requirements necessitated the need to improve the existing computer
hardware for the MLRS system. The following section presents the software
improvements and the changes to the MLRS hardware architecture, to meet the
requirements for Army TACMS.
C. ARMY TACTICAL MISSILE SYSTEM
The Army's need for the Army Tactical Missile System was first established in
a mission need statement (MNS) which outlined the need for a mobile, all weather,
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rapid response, deep attack conventional missile system that could attack high value
corps targets at ranges beyond the capability of existing cannons and rockets
[Ref. 34]. The thrust of the Army TACMS requirement was to integrate an
inertially guided missile into the already existing MLRS that would dispense a
payload of M74 submunitions on target locations. In addition, Army TACMS was
designed to integrate with the previously established logistic support structure for
MLRS. This included existing material handling equipment and transportation
modes. The deployment of Army TACMS was to require no increase in force
structure. Personnel requirements were to come from the compression of the existing
Corps LANCE units into nuclear only battalions and use of existing force structure
available. This system was designed to augment the current Field Artillery (FA)
capabilities. [Ref. 35]
In 1978, LTV was awarded a demonstration contract to determine the
feasibility for a long range system to attack enemy second echelon forces beyond the
capability of existing cannons and rockets. This produced a software algorithm,
termed the waypoint guidance method. This software required a missile to fly to
predetermined points in space as the most risk free way to increase the accuracy and
probability of hitting a desired target.
The initial production contract for Army TACMS was awarded in March 1986
to LTV Aerospace and Defense, Dallas, Texas. This was the same contractor
responsible for the development and support of the MLRS. The contract type was
awarded as fixed price incentive firm (FTIF) [Ref. 36:1.2.4.1c]. Largely, as
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a result of the contract type, coupled with the software technology already in the
contractor's possession, the contractor delivered software which met the minimum
Army TACMS requirements.
In addition to the initial contract, an integration contract was awarded of Army
TACMS into MLRS sole source to LTV. This required an upgrade to the existing
MLRS hardware to accommodate Army TACMS software requirements. The MLRS
software was to be rehosted into new computer hardware. Initially there was a
problem of having two different project offices in charge of the software acquisition
and integration requirement for a combined system. As a result, the Program
Executive Officer (PEO) assigned the responsibility for software configuration
management and release authority to the MLRS project office. Subsequent to the
PEO's decision, the MLRS project office has maintained the software for the entire
MLRS family of munitions (MFOM) to include Army TACMS. The MLRS project
recently established an MFOM interoperability testbed at SED. It provides a means
to test software changes, modifications, and upgrades.
To upgrade the MLRS for Army TACMS the FCS required modification to
some of the primary components and the addition of other components. This
included:
• Improved Electronics Unit (IEU): The IEU has three microprocessors and the
ability to be reprogrammed in the field by use of a Program Load Unit (PLU).
With this hardware modification software upgrades can now be accomplished
with the PLU. No physical modifications (i.e. PROM) are required. In addition,
the memory capacity was increased to provide for potential growth.
38
• Improved Stabilization Reference Package/Position Determining System
(ISRP/PDS): The ISRP/PDS provides the same functions as the SRP/PDS. It
also provides greater accuracy and greater speed required to support the
guided missiles fired from the MLRS.
• Payload Interface Module (PIM): The PIM provides the interface among the
launcher, IEU, and the payload (missile).
This launcher configuration, employing the IEU, ISRP/PDS, PIM, and the current
software, is referred to as the Deep Attack Launcher (Army TACMS). To provide
more growth potential and avoid obsolescence, a new FCS is being developed for
fielding in the 1998 time period.
Although the software changes themselves may be difficult, software changes
to the Army TACMS can now be easily accommodated as a result of these hardware
modifications to the basic MLRS launcher. Software changes resulting from
operational testing and field requirements have been incorporated into the system,
after verification, via the PLU. They required no hardware changes. The ability to
enhance Army TACMS through software changes has grown substantially as a result
of the increased hardware capacity.
The Army TACMS software, approximately 200,000 lines of code for the
MFOM, did attain the goal of being on schedule and within budget. There have been
a few problem areas encountered, as with all software intensive programs, for this
missile system. For the eight software management indicators, as compiled by SED,
the Army TACMS scored 5 green, 1 amber, and 2 red. The amber score in trouble
report resolution was due to the software changes made to incorporate the explicit
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guidance. The first red rating in computer resource utilization was due to memory
reserves exceeding 50 percent capacity. The other red rating in supportability was
due to a lack of documentation. All other areas were rated green. A more detailed
discussion on these anomalies will be presented in the analysis chapter.
The next section presents possible future developments and enhancements in
software capabilities that the Army TACMS project office is evaluating. These
programs are all software intensive.
D. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
The Army TACMS project office is presently assessing three new program
options: the Block II, extended range, and the enhancement program. All represent
increased combat potential for the Army TACMS missile. These systems will require
software developmental efforts that will use the existing hardware on the MLRS
platform.
The Block II program is designed to incorporate thirteen smart submunitions
into a modified Army TACMS missile. These smart munitions, referred to as
Brilliant Anti-Armor Submunitions (BATs), will have the mission to kill tanks,
armored personnel carriers, self-propelled vehicles, trucks, and personnel. The Block
II missile will fly to a predetermined dispense point and then release the BATs which
will then search for their targets. The software for the Block II will be written in
Ada, and will interface with the existing MLRS software (JOVIAL). There will be
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no hardware change to MLRS, the only change will be the addition of application
specific programs for this new type of munition.
The extended range missile decreases the payload of the conventional M74
submunitions by over two thirds and adds a Global Positioning System (GPS) to
provide greater navigational accuracy. By extending the length of the rocket motor
by eighteen inches, other potential enhancements are possible. With the additional
range and the GPS, a new payload of (six BATs, high explosive, or conventional M74
submunitions) could be used to destroy enemy targets at increased distances with
greater accuracy. A software change will be required to program this new
configuration.
Software, software development, and software support will play a major role
in the future programs associated with Army TACMS. Army TACMS has clearly
demonstrated growth potential for new missions and emerging munitions.
E. SUMMARY
Army TACMS and MLRS, both software intensive systems, have proven
themselves in a combat environment. This chapter was devoted to the historical
development that has lead to their success. The following chapter will conduct an
analysis with respect to possible TQM applications to the software.
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V. ANALYSIS WITH LESSONS LEARNED
A. TQM APPLICATIONS
This section presents the case analysis for the Army TACMS. Special emphasis
will be placed on software acquisition areas and the potential use of software TQM
principles that could be used during the acquisition process. The first section
presents general TQM applications to the process of software acquisition.
Subsequent sections focus on the three primary software TQM principles of process
control, standardization, and metrics, as they apply to Army TACMS.
1. Software TQM
Basic TQM beliefs are directly related to good management and
production of quality products during the acquisition process. Deming'sand Zultner's
principles and philosophies that apply to software related issues and the process of
TQM for Army TACMS are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Two of the critical aspects of TQM are management's commitment to
produce quality products (Deming's point 7) and to satisfy the customer (Deming's
point 1). All personnel interviewed in the Army TACMS program office, the MLRS
program office, SED, and the contractor's office have shown commitment to the
principle to produce quality software products. For example, they all use feedback
from the customer (user) to modify the software products to create a more friendly
interface between the user and the application software. The bottom line is that
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upper management, commensurate with GEN Turtle's beliefs, is committed to the
customer's needs.
Another important aspect of TQM is the institution of a software
education and a software self improvement program (Deming's points 6 and 13).
Although TQM principles are being taught in the MICOM community, there is no
structured educational program for software specific requirements. In addition,
elimination of barriers to communication (Deming's points 9 and 12) is essential for
software quality. There also appears to be some animosity among the program
offices, SED, and the contractors. These problems stem from the consternation over
who supports whom, and who has the ultimate responsibility for PDSS. This results
in barriers to communication.
Mobility of software specialists, especially contractor personnel, is counter
productive and is frequently cited as a reason for poor quality software products.
Zultner's adaptation of Deming's seven deadly diseases (number 4) states that
avoiding turnover in software personnel is important in producing quality software
products. This issue has confronted the Army TACMS contractor. Presently LTV
Corporation is in Chapter 11. This has resulted in a loss of a significant number of
software personnel to different organizations that show future potential for sustained
long term employment. Personnel continuity is an essential element for the
production of quality software products. The DOD PMs should emphasize this with
their contractor counterparts.
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Basic TQM principles are important in the production of quality software
products. This section identifies the basic TQM philosophies for the acquisition of
any product. These basic principles are then adapted to the process of software
acquisition as they apply to the Army TACMS. The following sections present the
specific software TQM principles of process control, standardization, and metrics as
they apply to Army TACMS.
2. Process Control
Software TQM applies to the entire software acquisition process. The SEI
Software Process Maturity Model provides a road map to software TQM. This
section presents the challenges that SED, the contractors, and program offices
encounter with respect to defining the various processes and maturity levels these
organizations face.
Process definition is a requirement for TQM. All the customers to each
portion of the process need to be identified. Proper identification of the entire
process is essential. The relationships among the program offices, SED, the users,
and the contractors need to be clearly defined.
For software acquisition the program office contracts for the required
software products. Then the contractor produces to the requirement. The SED
should provide support and expertise to the program office (the customer to SED).
This increases the probability the Government will obtain quality software products
from the contractor. Once the program office has accepted delivery of the software
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it is its responsibility to provide service to the customer. This is the first step in
contracting for new software.
For PDSS issues, the role of customer and producer are reversed. If SED
is held responsible for the software support, they become the customer to the
program office. The program office now would have the responsibility to provide a
supportable product that meets the customer's needs to the SED for purpose of
software sustainment.
Establishing a clearly defined process among the program office, SED, and
the contractor is necessary for process definition, a requirement for software TQM.
Also, each organization needs to be responsive and understand the needs of the next
customer in their chain. In the case of Army TACMS a clearly defined process for
the acquisition and support of the software .was not explicitly apparent during the
investigatory work for this thesis.
In addition, SED personnel acknowledge that their organization is at the
same maturity level as most other software companies, level 2. The SED faces the
same problem industry faces of the limited number of available software personnel
verses requirements for these software experts. In addition, SED is confronted with
the fact that the DOD budget is shrinking. This limits their ability to hire an
adequate software engineering staff. At the same time they are experiencing an
exponential growth in the software requirements for weapon systems. To effectively
increase their maturity level SED needs more experienced personnel. Educational
opportunities are also limited by the present budget.
45
Proper identification of the software acquisition process and the
opportunity to increase one's SEI maturity level are essential elements for successful
software TQM. As outlined by Deming (points 3 and 5), once the process is
identified continuous improvement to that process is required to attain quality
products.
3. Standardization
Applying TQM principles to software acquisition requires the use of
standardization. Standardization provides a reduction in the variability of the
software development process. Presently, both Army TACMS and MLRS software
is written in JOVIAL and assembly language. The Block II Army TACMS software,
if approved, will be written in Ada. This will present an ever greater standardization
problem because there will then be three different languages in use. The lack of
standardization in Army TACMS will be alleviated when the new FCS is fielded. The
FCS software is required to be written in Ada. Ada will provide standardization in
the MLRS family of munitions. At this point one of the key software TQM principles
will be realized.
4. Metrics
The set of eight metrics established by the MICOM SED are an excellent
starting point for implementing the provisions of software TQM to missile systems.
The SED personnel indicated that these metrics will be continuously updated based
upon constant feedback on the system. This is a TQM philosophy. The set of metrics
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provides the feasibility of using SPC to aid in continuous process improvements for
software maintenance.
The SED rates Army TACMS as a low risk (green status) in the following
areas: requirements stability, software developmentmanpower, software development
process, schedule risk analysis, and software product delivery. In terms of software
TQM these areas are within statistical control parameters.
The SED rates one Army TACMS software metric as medium risk or
amber. This rating was given to the trouble report resolution metric. It is the result
of the incorporation of a new flight algorithm, termed explicit guidance, being
incorporated into the software. This indicator appears to be a good metric when it
is applied to trouble reports that indicate a software problem. The metric indicates
the relative frequency, severity, and age of the trouble report. Explicit guidance was
actually a software enhancement change that increased the capabilities of the Army
TACMS. This indicator appears as amber as a result of the age of the trouble
reports associated with the explicit guidance. These trouble reports will be closed
when the next version is released. A green rating is then anticipated.
The first red or high risk rating was in the area of computer resource
utilization. Army TACMS exceeded the 50 percent utilization requirement for certain
memory and throughput reserve capacities. This situation is expected to be remedied
with the fielding of the new FCS. A second red rating was given in the area of
supportability. The supportability issues are focused on PDSS documentation
problems. The lack of documentation and software errors are the major contributors
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to this rating. This metric is expected to improve as the contractor provides more
documentation and resolves software errors.
The SED metrics are living documents that were adopted in June, 1991.
These metrics will require modification and further tuning as feedback information
is reviewed. They are an excellent start of applying another TQM principle to
software acquisition.
B. LESSONS LEARNED
This section presents software lessons learned during this study. First, generic
lessons learned are presented. Then lessons learned from the Army TACMS software
point of view are given.
1. Generic Software Lessons Learned
General Tuttle has emphasized the importance of software in modern
weapon systems. He also describes four generic software lessons learned that the
software acquisition community should keep in mind. They are:
• It's much cheaper to introduce changes early [in the process].
• [We] need software models that promote prototyping, iteration and
parallelism.
• There's a cost in supporting fielded software that we must incur, even if we
don't make changes.
• We must adhere to the DOD's single standard programming language: Ada.
[Ref. 1]
48
2. Army TACMS Software Lessons Learned
The following lessons learned are compiled from the Army TACMS
project. Each lesson learned is presented with possible TQM applications.
The most impressive lesson learned is associated with the flight path
algorithm. The prime contractor chose a way point guidance flight path due to their
experience during the demonstration contract. The way point guidance method was
used to minimize the contractor's risk, an important consideration for FPIF
contracts.
It was found that the way point guidance raised a survivability issue at long
ranges. As a result, a new software algorithm was designed, termed explicit guidance.
This algorithm increased the velocity and apogee of the missile to enhance the
survivability. As an added benefit the over all range was increased by an incredible
24 percent. Most impressive is the fact that this improvement was accomplished with
only a software change. No hardware change was required. Applying software TQM,
avoidance of this scenario may be is illustrated by one of Zultner's deadly diseases
(number 2): avoiding short term goals. The lesson learned: structure a contract for
software requirements such that it is adaptable for future expandability requirements
or provides incentives to the contractor to achieve capabilities in excess of the
minimum requirements but within budget and schedule. Do not contract for
minimum software thresholds.
A second lesson learned is associated with the Army TACMS and MLRS
software integration contract. Both project offices were in charge of the software
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development for their particular applications. The problem encountered was that
there was no one organization in charge of the overall development. There was
confusion as to which organization had the authority and responsibility to make
changes and provide configuration control for the software. This problem was
remedied by placing the requirement for software configuration management and
support with the MLRS project office for the MFOM. The turbulence, was
eliminated. The lesson learned: have one organization in charge of overall software
related integration, configuration management, and support requirements.
User interface requirements generate another lesson learned. The ISRP
requires approximately eleven minutes to load the software for Army TACMS. If the
system is shutdown while the ISRP is loading the firmware in the ISRP is damaged.
This requires a contractor to perform costly and time consuming hardware
maintenance to change out the firmware. The prompt on the FCP that warns of this
problem is not highly visible during the ISRP software loading process. As a result
ISRP's have been damaged. Avoiding Zultner's first of seven deadly diseases,
satisfying user requirements, is the software TQM principle that was over looked in
this case. This was because the user's requirements were not clearly identified. The
lesson learned: conduct manprint studies to ensure the input/output devices are user
friendly.
Another source of problems is encountered by the requirement for SED
to yearly contract for support. SED does not currently have the inhouse capability
to perform all the PDSS requirements, nor the manpower allocations. Contracted
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personnel and turn over cause a loss in personnel continuity for the software support
process. SED is attempting to alleviate this situation by getting a multi-year contract.
However, the potential for loss of continuity still exists. From Zultner's seven deadly
diseases, number 4 establishes the need to maintain continuity of personnel for
software TQM. The lesson learned: if possible, increase SED's inhouse capabilities
to better preserve manpower continuity in the software acquisition process for PDSS.
It is felt that there is less turnover of Government personnel.
The quality of contractor personnel presents one more lesson learned.
Currently LTV is in Chapter 11, which has caused a large number of software
personnel to leave LTV. It has made it difficult for the company to hire software
people from the limited pool of available professionals. This loss of continuity causes
inefficiency in the software acquisition process (Zultner's deadly disease number 4).
The lesson learned: if possible, contract with an organization that is rated above
maturity Level (2) and has a proven record for personnel continuity. Level (2) starts
to focus on personnel and process groups as an important element in producing
quality software.
The last lesson learned pertains to configuration control. During operation
Desert Storm, one unit loaded the wrong software revision for the MLRS. This
resulted in their inability to fire the conventional MLRS missiles. The lesson learned:
configuration control for different software revision levels is essential. Color coding
could be a possible solution to this problem. A different color for each revision level
would assist the programmer to assure the proper software is installed.
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C. SUMMARY
This chapter presented the case analysis for Army TACMS with special
emphasis being place on software TQM issues and applications. The importance of
life cycle requirements were illustrated. The most significant lessons learned for
Army TACMS were presented to provide examples for future software acquisition
projects. The end result shows that software TQM philosophies, when properly
employed, can result in quality software.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
Software acquisition for modern weapon systems presents the biggest challenge
for program managers. The requirement for software in these sophisticated systems
has grown at an exponential rate over the past four decades. The demand for
qualified software engineers far exceeds the available resources of these experts.
Most of DOD acquisition top management have a hardware acquisition orientation.
Software engineering is considered a "black art" too complex to understand. PDSS
constitutes up to 70 percent of the life cycle costs associated with software. Poor
software quality is often the result, with cost and schedule over runs common. Such
factors are some of the primary contributors leading to software being named the
"Achilles' Heel" in weapon systems development. The PM's challenge is to acquire
quality software products.
This thesis has found that Total Quality Management can be applied to
software acquisition with a resulting improvement in the process. As previously
discussed, software TQM focuses on the entire process that produces the software
product, not just the final result. The three primary TQM principles most applicable
to software acquisition are: process control, standardization, and metrics.
Implementation of these principles will help to alleviate the current software crisis.
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The SEI has constructed a software maturity model that can be used to
evaluate software producing organizations. This model provides a road map to
software TQM for organizations wanting to institute software TQM philosophies.
Today, most producers are rated at the low end of the scale and have much room
for improvement. The SEI model provides an excellent model for software
organizations to improve their process and the quality of their software products. The
SEI model is dynamic. It has undergone modification to better refine the process.
This model will prove its utility as software organizations adopt its philosophies.
Standardization and a set of useful metrics are software TQM principles.
Standardization through the use of Ada has the potential to reduce variation and
provides the opportunity for software reuse. The set of metrics used by the MICOM
SED is an excellent starting point for instituting a standard set of tools to measure
the software acquisition process and determine if the process is in SPC. The SED
metrics will prove their value as they are refined through the feedback process and
continual process improvement.
The Army TACMS is a software intensive system that has proven its
effectiveness in operation Desert Storm. The Army TACMS has provided an
excellent case study for software acquisition. Not withstanding its success in Desert
Storm, important lessons were learned that will prove beneficial to future software
acquisition programs. In this work, software TQM principles have been outlined for
Army TACMS.
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The software TQM philosophy can be used for software acquisition. For this
to happen, top management, as evidenced by GEN Tuttle, must be committed to the
process.
Software acquisition is the long pole in the tent for systems acquisition. At the
same time software is a force multiplier. Commitment to quality software products
for the Armed Forces is a mandatory requirement for PMs. The following section
draws together five recommendations resulting from this research.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Implement Software TQM
All software developing organizations should adopt the philosophies of
software TQM as outlined in this thesis. Education is an essential element of TQM.
When greater software development knowledge is acquired by management, then the
probability of producing quality software will also be increased. Adaptation of the
SEI maturity model, Ada, and a set of metrics are essential for software TQM.
Management needs to focus on the entire process of software acquisition in order
to obtain quality software products.
2. Assess the SED Metrics and Seek New Metrics
The set of eight metrics used by SED to provide management information
on software development was established in June 1991. This set of metrics, as
indicated by SED personnel, are a living document that will be modified as
knowledge is gained on their utility. The validity of these metrics will be
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demonstrated if they indicate a software development project is successful from its
start to finish and, when fielded on time and within cost, proves to be successful to
the user. In other words, if all the indicators are green for the software development
of a project, and this project is successful, then it could be concluded the metrics are
a good set of software development indicators. These metrics are an excellent start
to SPC of the entire software acquisition process. SED should monitor their accuracy
and make adjustments when necessary. They should also continue to search for other
metrics which would prove useful.
3. Cross Train Software Personnel
Within the MICOM community there needs to be a greater understanding
of responsibilities between the project offices and the SED. A cross training program
that assigns SED personnel to a program office would be an excellent opportunity
for both organizations to gain greater knowledge of the entire process of software
acquisition. The opportunity for SED personnel to work in a project office, for a
specified time period, should be considered professional development. It should not
be deemed a career jeopardizing move. The result will be mutual respect and
understanding by both organizations.
In keeping with the TQM philosophy of serving your customer, software
acquisition offers some interesting points. For software the project needs the
professional advice of the SED. The program office should be looked upon as the
customer of SED. SED should seek to constantly improve their product (support)
to their customer (the program office).
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At the same time the PM should be looking at SED as one of its
customers. Of course, one usually looks at the soldier in the field as the ultimate
customer. But SED must also be looked upon as a customer of the PM. SED will
eventually become the configuration manager of the delivered software. As such SED
will be very concerned that the software development process focuses on the future
maintainability of the software. The PM should strive to provide a quality product
to his customer, SED. This aspect is frequently overlooked in weapon systems
acquisition.
4. Fund SED
PDSS costs are estimated to be as high as 70 percent of the software
acquisition life cycle cost. PDSS requirements tend to be neglected. The MICOM
SED is understaffed to perform these functions and is required to subcontract for
the additional support. Continuity is often lost as contracts are awarded yearly.
Software and therefore PDSS requirements are increasing. DOD needs to adequately
fund all PDSS organizations to ensure software quality is achieved. Software is
critical for our weapon systems. Software quality is a combat multiplier.
5. Use the SEI Model
The SEI Software Process Maturity Model should be used as a guide for
evaluating software production and support organizations. Software acquisition
should be a continuously improving process. The SEI model may serve as a road
map to improve software TQM. The SEI model should be used to assess potential
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software contractors. To ensure quality software products, a contractor should have
a rating of two or more to be considered as a viable software producer.
C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The following answers are the results of the analysis completed on interviews
with the personnel shown in Appendix C.
1. How can the software acquisition process be improved?
• Implement the software TQM principles outlined in this thesis.
• Clearly define user requirements prior to software design. This will ensure a
stable design.
• Implement training programs (e.g., TQM, Software Engineering, Systems
Engineering) to provide education and a better understanding among all
people involved in software acquisition.
• Ensure adequate documentation for PDSS.
• Use Case studies and lessons learned on software acquisition as a management
tool.
• Involve the user in determining software capabilities.
• Use independent verification and validation for software evaluation.
• Review subcontractor's software policies.
• Ensure configuration control for the field.
• Properly define software test requirements.
• Plan for software P3I.
• Make software user friendly.
• Eliminate hardware mentality for software.
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• Use a system engineering approach.
2. What situations, from a historical point of view, have caused the current
software crisis?
• Rapid growth of software requirements.
• Little knowledge of historical software information.
• A focus on hardware acquisition mind set.
• Lack of a systems engineering approach.
• Lack of quality software documentation.
• Lack of adequate PDSS.
• No clearly defined software development process.
• No standardization of programming languages.
• Work breakdown structure not used for software.
• Trying to fix hardware shortcomings with software changes.
3. How can Total Quality Management principles be applied to the software
acquisition process?
• Management commitment to TQM.
• Introduction of process control (e.g., SEI Model).
• Standardization (e.g., Ada).
• Use of metrics (e.g., SED indicators).
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4. What lessons can be derived from the Army Tactical Missile System
software acquisition process?
• Do not use a FPIF contract for software development.
• Do not contract for minimum requirements in software. Provide incentives for
future expandability needs.
• Software integration contract should be headed by only one organization.
• Define user requirements up front, make software more user friendly. Involve
the user.
• Continuity in software support personnel is needed.
• Contractor personnel turbulence/turnover causes inefficiency.
• Configuration control is very important.
• Plan for software P3I.
5. What questions should a PM ask to ensure that the software acquisition
process is under control?
• Continuously ask software related questions as shown in Appendix B.
• Become familiar with and use MICOM SED Metrics as a guide.
• Know and use software regulations and standards (DOD- STD-2167A).
6. What are the similarities and the differences between software and
hardware acquisition?
• Software has the potential to get better with age. Hardware normally does not.
• Hardware is tangible, software is intangible.
• Software development is in its youth.
• Detailed test plans are often neglected for software.
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• Software development is human intensive and time dependent. Expenditure of
more money will not speed up the process of software development.
7. What is the quality of a contractor's programming staff?
• Most software developing organizations are between Levels 1 and 2 on the SEI
maturity model.
• LTV is in Chapter 11, and quality software engineers are not attracted to this
organization.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
The following are areas that deserve follow up:
1. SEI Software Process Maturity Model
Determine if software producing organizations know and understand the
SEI model. Determine if software producing organizations have increased in their
maturity level by using the model. Determine if this model has matured as it has
changed during its evolution. Determine if this model can be used for contracting
purposes. Determine what private industry thinks of the model.
2. Army TACMS Block II Development
Examine the software challenges facing the Block II development.
Determine the interface problems with the two languages of Ada and JOVIAL.
Determine the software challenges with the communications software interfaces.
Determine the software relationship between the BAT program office and the Army
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TACMS program office. Determine SED's responsibility and role for this software
development effort.
3. Software Lessons Learned from Desert Storm
Document the software lessons learned during Desert Storm. Determine
the strong and weak points for software. Determine what software changes were
made to weapon systems as a result of operation Desert Storm. Determine how
software was a force multiplier. Analyze the lessons learned.
4. Analyze MICOM SED Metrics
Examine the MICOM SED metrics currently used. Determine if this is a
good set of indicators. Determine the reasons for constructing these metrics.
Determine if these metrics do indeed predict quality software. Determine if
contractors have confidence in these metrics. Determine if these eight metrics will
evolve as a function of time. Determine if there are other beneficial metrics that can
be used. Determine the costs of using such metrics.
5. PM Software Challenges
Document the challenges that all PMs face during the process of software
acquisition. Construct a list that has been compiled from many different sources and
PMs. Document lessons learned. Determine how to incorporate better software
development processes. Determine how PDSS support is used for sustainment of
major weapon systems. Determine if PMs understand software metrics. Determine
how to better contract for software in a weapon system contract.
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The Army TACMS presents an excellent case study in software acquisition
and related software challenges faced by PMs in the DOD. This weapon system has
a proven combat effectiveness. Army TACMS demonstrated how software can be a
force multiplier in Desert Storm. All personnel interviewed are committed to the
combat soldier. Implementation of software TQM has been initiated. Further study
on the Army TACMS software related issues will prove to be beneficial to future
PMs.
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APPENDIX A. LIST OF ACRONYMS
AMC Army Materiel Command
AR Army Regulation
ARES Army Executives for Software
BAT Brilliant Anti-Armor Submunition
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DLSIE Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange
DOD Department of Defense
DSMC Defense Systems Management College
DSSE Developmental Software Support Environment
EU Electronics Unit
FA Field Artillery
FCP Fire Control Panel
FCS Fire Control System
FCU Fire Control Unit
FPIF Fixed Price Incentive Fee
GAO Government Accounting Office
GPS Global Positioning System




IOC Initial Operational Capability
LCSSE Life Cycle Software Support Environment
MCCR Mission Critical Computer Resources
MFOM MLRS Family of Munitions
MICOM Missile Command
MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System
MNS Mission Need Statement
OT&E Operational Test and Evaluation
P3I Preplanned Product Improvement
PEO Program Executive Officer
PDCA Plan Do Check Act
PDSS Post Deployment Software Support
PIM Payload Interface Module
PLU Program Load Unit
PM Program/Product Manager
PROM Program Read Only Memory
SED Software Engineering Directorate
SEI Software Engineering Institute
SLOC Source Line of Code
SPC Statistical Process Control
65
SRP/PDS Stabilization Reference Package/Position Determining System
TACMS Tactical Missile System
TOW Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided Weapon System
TQM Total Quality Management
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command
TSM TRADOC System Manager
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APPENDIX B. PROGRAM MANAGER'S QUESTIONS
The following is a list of appropriate questions a PM should ask with regards
to software acquisition. The list is provided as a guide, and is not intended to be all
inclusive. All questions should be answered in the affirmative.
I. Basic Questions:
1. Are the provisions of software TQM being implemented?
2. Is the contractor's maturity level known?
3. Is the contractor attempting to increase their maturity level?
4. Are software metrics used?
5. Are the metrics a good indicator of your software acquisition process?
6. Is the standardized Ada HOL being used?
7. Are the user need's clearly identified?
8. Are the input/output devices user friendly?
9. Has the documentation been streamlined, yet complete?
10. Will the contractor's documentation support PDSS?
11. Is the computer utilization below 50 percent?
12. Does the contractor have a software training program?
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II. Software Development Questions:
1. Is the software test plan complete?
2. Is all of the documentation in DOD-STD-2167A necessary?
3. Can DOD-STD-2167A be tailored for cost savings?
4. Are the test ranges scheduled?
5. Is the software patch free?
6. Are errors corrected at the source code level?
7. Is the software support element clearly defined?
8. Are the software security requirements identified?
9. Have software risk areas been identified?
10. Has the software configuration management and control been defined?
11. Have configuration audits been established?
12. Will an independent verification and validation be conducted?
13. Does the RFP contain software metrics that the contractor will be
required to meet?
14. Can this software be reused for different applications?
15. Has integration testing been defined?
16. Is the software easy to change or update?
17. Are the compilers validated?
18. Has the built in test equipment been defined?
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APPENDIX C. LIST OF PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED
1. Matthews, David F., COL USA. Program Manager, Army Tactical Missile
System, Redstone Arsenal, AL, Interviews, November 1991 and January 1992.
2. Flohr, Steven W., LTC USA. Product Manager, Block II, Army Tactical Missile
System, Redstone Arsenal, AL, Interview, January 1992.
3. Maxwell, John M., Assistant Project Manager, Integration, Army Tactical
Missile System, Redstone Arsenal, AL, Interviews, November 1991 and January
1992.
4. Evans, Jerry, ChiefComputer Resources Branch, Army Tactical Missile System,
Redstone Arsenal, AL, Interview, January 1992.
5. Williams, Woodrow A., Computer Resources Branch, Army Tactical Missile
System, Redstone Arsenal, AL, Interview, November 1991.
6. Boydstun, Byron R., Electronics Engineer, Multiple Launch Rocket System,
Redstone Arsenal, AL, Interview, January 1992.
7. Fitzpatrick, Willie, Software Evaluation, Test and Control Division, MICOM
Software Engineering Directorate, Redstone Arsenal AL, Interview, January
1992.
8. Moore, Robert L., Acting Chief, Deployed Systems Division, MICOM Software
Engineering Directorate, Redstone Arsenal, AL, Interview, January 1992.
9. Eubanks, James E., P.E. Senior Systems Engineer, Barrios Technology,
Huntsville, AL, Interview, January 1992.
10. Quirk, Michael P., Senior Systems Engineer, Barrios, Technology, Huntsville,
AL, Interview, November 1991.
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1.
APPENDIX D. THE 14 POINTS FOR SOFTWARE MANAGERS [Ref. 21]
Create constancy of purpose for the continuous improvement of software and
service, with a long term plan to become excellent, satisfy users, and provide
jobs.
Adopt the new philosophy. We are in a new age of software engineering and
software quality. Software managers must awaken to the challenge, learn their
responsibilities, and take on the leadership for change.
Cease dependence on mass inspection (especially testing) to achieve quality.
Reduce the need for appraisal by building quality into the software in the first
place. Inspections and testing are not the answer. They are too late and
unreliable—they do not produce quality.
End the practice of awarding business on price alone. Instead minimize total
cost. Move toward a single source for any one item or service, making them a
partner in a long-term relationship of loyalty and trust.
Constantly and forever improve the software development process, to improve
quality and productivity, and thus constantly decrease the time and cost of
software. Improving quality is not a one-time effort.
Institute training on the job. Everyone must be well trained, as solid skills are
essential for improvement.
Institute leadership. It is a leader's job to help their people, not judge them.
It is to know when their people need special help, and provide it. Supervision
of software managers and professionals is in need of an overhaul.
Drive out fear. Develop trust so that everyone may work effectively.
Management should be held responsible for faults of the organization and
environment.
Break down barriers between areas. People must work as a team. They must
cooperate to foresee and prevent problems during software development and
use.
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10. Eliminate slogans, exhortations, and targets that ask for zero defects, and new
levels of productivity without providing methods. Slogans don't build quality
software.
11. Eliminate arbitrary numerical quotas and goals. Substitute leadership. Quotas
and goals (such as schedules) address numbers—not quality and methods.
12. Remove barriers to pride of workmanship. The responsibility of project
managers must be changed from schedules to quality.
13. Institute a vigorous program of education and encourage self-improvement for
everyone. There must be a continuing education and application commitment
by managers and professional staff.
14. Put everyone to work to accomplish the transformation. The transformation is
everyone's job. Everyone has a part to play in improvement. Management's job
is to accomplish the transformation.
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APPENDIX E. DOD MATURITY MODEL [Ref. 27]
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